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Reflection on talk of reasons for action or belief suggests that reasons 
serve both normative and explanatory purposes.  After all, reasons are cited in 
answer both to “why should he do it?” and “why is he doing it?”, as well as in 
answer both to “why should he believe it?” and “why does he believe it?”.  These 
normative and explanatory functions are not distinct.  To explain by citing 
someone’s reason is to state a factor in virtue of whose support the action was 
performed or the proposition believed.  One might think that this normative-
explanatory nexus, as Joseph Raz has labeled it, is at the heart of rationality.1 
That will, in any case, be our working hypothesis in this paper.  We argue that the 
aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality and, furthermore, that it 
does so in its own way.   
We contend that just as a theoretical judgment is a stance on whether to 
believe p, and a practical judgment is a stance on whether to do x, an aesthetic 
judgment is a stance on whether to appreciate o.  Aesthetic judgment, properly 
understood, is reducible neither to a judgment about what to believe nor to a 
judgment about what to do.2  It is appreciation rather than belief or intention.3  
Correlatively, reasons supporting these different sorts of judgment operate in 
fundamentally different ways.  The irreducibility of the aesthetic domain is due, 
we argue, to the fact that aesthetic judgment is a sensory-affective disclosure of, 
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and responsiveness to, merit: it is a feeling that presents an object, and is 
responsive to it, as worthy of being liked.  
Our strategy is as follows.  In the first section, we will sketch the view, 
exhibiting both what we take to be the analogies between the theoretical, the 
practical and the aesthetic—the normative-explanatory nexus that runs between 
these three domains of rationality—and the categorical differences between them.  
In the second section, we argue that our account succeeds at the task of 
accommodating the pressure to conceive of aesthetic judgment, on the one hand, 
as first-personal and non-transferable and, on the other hand, as registering the 
presence of a genuine aspect of the world.  Our view will be shown to be superior 
to both subjectivist conceptions of aesthetic judgment, such as traditional 
Expressivism and Relativism, and the widely-held objectivist conceptions, 
according to which it is a species of (non-relative) belief. 
 
I.  We begin this section by sketching our view of the differences between the 
way reasons function in the theoretical, practical and aesthetic domains. 
Reasons for thinking that a certain proposition is to be believed fall into 
the category of evidence, broadly construed.  If you say, “the cat is on the mat” 
and we ask you why you think so, you satisfy us if you tell us that you can see him, 
or that you have checked everywhere else he might be, or that you have it on 
excellent authority.4  These explanations reveal both what supports believing the 
proposition and what leads you to believe it.  The theoretical question “why” 
demands something in the family of a proof of the proposition and an account of 
why you hold it to be true—demands that are not to be satisfied separately, but at 
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once.  Normally, there is no rational step between viewing p as to be believed in 
virtue of q and believing p on the basis of q.   
We do not have a catch-all word for the category of reasons for judging 
that an action is to be performed, but its rough contours are familiar.  If you say, 
“I am marching on Washington”, and we ask you “why?”, we are not asking for 
the evidence that you are doing it.  We do not take you to have answered our 
question if you tell us that the Washington monument is now coming into view 
among a throng of protesters.  We are interested rather in what there is to be said 
in favor of your doing it—specifically, the favoring considerations or further 
project that motivates you.  At issue is not support of a belief, but support of an 
action—practical justification.  You satisfy us if you tell us that you are marching 
on Washington from boredom, because you support the cause, or for the exercise.  
The practical “why?” question demands an answer that gives at once both a 
justification of the action and an account of why one is performing it.  
So far, we have given a rationale for thinking of belief and action as placed 
analogously in their distinctive normative-explanatory orders.5  Now, to the 
aesthetic case.  We also do not have a catch-all word for the category of reasons 
for judging that an artwork is to be appreciated, but we will argue—here 
intuitively, and in section two more rigorously—that they are neither evidence 
nor reasons supporting action.   If you say, “North by Northwest is excellent”, 
and we ask you for your reasons, we are typically not asking about your evidence 
for believing that it is excellent.  We would be nonplussed if you reply by telling 
us that Manhola Dargis finds the movie excellent.  For we would have expected 
you to tell us why you like it.  Dargis’s liking it may be really good evidence that 
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the film is good, and so a reason for believing that it is good, but it is not an 
answer to the question of why you appreciate it.  And it is appreciation—which on 
our view just is aesthetic judgment—that a statement such as “North by 
Northwest is excellent” normally expresses (and is taken to express).  
Aesthetic judgment, we contend, is a specifically aesthetic form of liking.6  
It is not a matter of what you happen to like, but what is worth liking—or, in any 
case, what seems worth liking from the point of view of the feeling.  Aesthetic 
judgment is not a private, subjective feeling of pleasure, but (in the paradigmatic 
case) a feeling merited by the object.  Accordingly, if you tell us that you like the 
film because Cary Grant reminds you of a favorite elementary school teacher, 
your liking is not aesthetic in the relevant sense.  To aesthetically judge an object, 
your liking must be explained by those features of the object that (seem to) make 
it worth liking; those features that (seem to) explain why it is to be appreciated.  
These are aesthetic reasons.  For aesthetic judgment to be aesthetically justified is 
for the liking to be in fact explained by those features of the object that make it 
worth liking.  And so, the aesthetic “why?” question demands an answer that 
states at once both what led you to like the object and what makes it worth liking.  
It follows that you have not given us the right sort of answer if you tell us 
merely that going to see the film would be a good idea.  What we want to know is 
not what the film might do for us, but rather what makes it aesthetically great.  
That it will do something for us may give us a very good reason to go to see the 
film, but it does not necessarily portray it as having aesthetic merit.  Thus, 
although it may support an action, such a reason does not support aesthetic 
judgment—it is a practical rather than an aesthetic reason.   
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The problem cannot be fixed by specifying that the promised outcome 
must bear on beauty or art.  It might be thought that if the reason for going to see 
the film is obviously aesthetically irrelevant—say, that it cures baldness—then the 
reason and corresponding explanation is not aesthetic.  But if, instead, the 
promised outcome is, say, that it will improve one’s taste, then this reason is both 
practical and aesthetic.  However, this reason is still not aesthetic in the relevant 
sense—not the kind of reason required for justifying an aesthetic judgment. 
Compare the proposal under consideration to an analogous doxastic case.  
If you are promised access to a long list of new truths in exchange for believing an 
absurd proposition, you have not been given a properly doxastic reason for 
belief—notwithstanding the fact that believing the absurd proposition would be a 
doxastic bonanza.  Doxastic reasons explain someone’s believing something in 
virtue of the subject’s viewing those reasons as supporting the truth of the 
explained belief.  When one infers, for example, one views the belief-worthiness 
of the premises as supporting the belief-worthiness of the conclusion.   Similarly, 
aesthetic reasons explain someone’s appreciating an object in virtue of the 
subject’s viewing the appreciation-worthiness of the cited features as conferring 
appreciation-worthiness onto the object as a whole.  These structural facts—and 
not facts having to do with the content of reasons—are what distinguish 
theoretical, practical and aesthetic reasons.   
Thus, to take something as an aesthetic reason is not to believe a 
proposition, but to appreciate a part of an object.  More colloquially, it is to like 
an object in virtue of liking something about it.  And this is to see the aesthetic 
worth of the part as conferring aesthetic worth on the whole.  So, for example, I 
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appreciate North by Northwest on the basis of its direction and acting, viewing 
these as aesthetically worthy—i.e., appreciating them—and as conferring 
aesthetic worth on the film as a whole.7 
When we judge an object to be beautiful, we are (often at least) responsive 
to reasons for appreciating it.  Like reasons for believing and reasons for acting, 
these reasons are both explanatory and normative: they explain why we in fact 
judge the object to be beautiful—which is to say, why we appreciate it—and also 
why one ought to so judge it.  At the same time, aesthetic reasons are 
categorically different from reasons for believing and reasons for acting.  The 
central distinguishing feature of aesthetic reasons is that they are reasons for 
feeling a certain way.  And to be responsive to these reasons is itself to be in a 
certain affective state.  Neither believing a certain proposition (not even the 
proposition that the object merits a certain feeling) nor doing something with 
regard to the object counts as responsiveness to aesthetic reasons qua aesthetic 
reasons.8 
On this picture, aesthetic judgment is a positive affective attitude towards 
the object—a feeling of liking.  The foregoing discussion suggests three respects in 
which (aesthetic) appreciation is a distinctive form of liking:  First, unlike blind 
sensation, aesthetic liking is itself cognitive insofar as it is, in the words of John 
McDowell, “a feeling [constituting] an experience in which the world reveals itself 
to us.”9  Second, unlike a subjective pleasure that is grounded in the appreciator’s 
idiosyncratic constitution and circumstances, and that presents an object merely 
as a source of one’s pleasure, aesthetic pleasure presents the object as meriting 
that very feeling.  In aesthetically enjoying a good film, you view the film not only 
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as causing your pleasure, but as worthy of being enjoyed.  Contrast this with your 
enjoyment of the wind driving sleet into your eyes.  Although in finding the 
experience pleasurable, you view the sleet as the source of your pleasure, you do 
not view your enjoyment of it as in any sense justified—so that failing to take 
pleasure in it would be an error of some sort.  Thus, although your enjoyment has 
an explanation—it reminds you of happy Pittsburgh days, perhaps—you do not 
view this enjoyment as a reason for anyone else to enjoy it.  However, in 
appreciating the fine acting and direction of North by Northwest, you do view 
them as such reasons.  In this case, you do think someone who fails to enjoy the 
film, and to enjoy it in part on the basis of the acting and direction, is failing qua 
film-appreciator.   Third, and relatedly, the reasons for liking that you are 
responsive to in appreciating the work are universal, in the following sense:  they 
are reasons for everyone to enjoy the object when appropriately engaging with it.  
The same cannot be said for your enjoyment of, say, your favorite team’s victory 
in the championship game, which presents the victory as meriting enjoyment, 
perhaps, but only that of the team’s fans.  
Aesthetic appreciation has a fourth distinguishing mark.  It is self-
contained, in the following sense: to enjoy an object aesthetically is not to enjoy it 
in virtue of its suitability to some other purpose, as one might appreciate the 
design of a mop that made the mopper’s job much easier in various ways.  
Perhaps such appreciation is indeed (1) cognitive (2) merit-attributing, and even 
(3) universal.  However, it is not the liking of what merits liking simply because it 
merits liking.  Rather, one likes it because it is elegantly conducive to some other 
end.  Accordingly, if, when we ask you why you are delighted with the Jar Jar 
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Binks figurine we gave you for your birthday, you say that the shape of its head 
makes it a perfect pipe-cleaner, then we know that your appreciation is not 
aesthetic.  Aesthetic appreciation has a characteristic structure: it is the kind of 
appreciation that expresses the universal pleasure that the object merits and that 
cannot be explained by reference to its suitability for some further purpose.10  
Aesthetic judgment is not on this conception the sum of a belief (that the 
object is worthy of appreciation) AND a separable feeling (in which perhaps the 
belief is grounded).  The logical form of appreciation is simple, not conjunctive.  
It is through the feeling itself that one both becomes aware of the merit of the 
object and is responsive to it as worthy of this specific feeling.11  Aesthetic 
pleasure is both ‘object-directed’ and ‘self-directed’: by being conscious of what 
the object merits, the subject is conscious of her feeling’s propriety.12  
Before moving on to our defense, two clarifications are in order.  First, it 
will be useful to distinguish our view from Sentimentalism in aesthetics, with 
which it might be confused.  Second, insofar as our view relies on a claimed 
similarity between appreciation and perception, it is crucial (a) to establish the 
limits of this comparison, and (b) to do so in a way that does not undermine our 
reliance on their similarity. 
 Sentimentalism, at least as it is now generally understood, is primarily a 
view about aesthetic properties, concepts, or value.  According to a 
Sentimentalist, for an object to exemplify a certain aesthetic property (for the 
concept to apply to it, for it to possess a certain value) is for it to be fitting to feel 
a certain sentiment with respect to it.13  But Sentimentalists assume, along with 
most others, that an aesthetic judgment is a theoretical judgment concerning 
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aesthetic properties.  Our goal is neither to offer nor refute an analysis of 
aesthetic properties, concepts or value, but rather to argue that aesthetic 
judgment is in fact distinct from theoretical judgment (and practical judgment).  
It is false, we argue, that an aesthetic judgment is a belief that an object merits a 
certain affective response (or any other response)—even if, as the Sentimentalist 
says, it is true that for an object to possess an aesthetic property is for it to merit a 
certain affective response.14  
 This difference in how aesthetic judgment is conceived ramifies into a 
crucial difference in how these views conceive aesthetic reasons.  Here is why it 
might seem as if our view about aesthetic judgment and the Sentimentalist view 
of aesthetic properties converge on aesthetic reasons.  Since we hold that 
aesthetic judgment is a feeling, reasons supporting such judgment are reasons for 
feeling.  And since the Sentimentalist holds that to possess an aesthetic property 
is for a certain affective response to be warranted, reasons for believing an object 
to possess an aesthetic property are ipso facto reasons for feeling a certain way 
about it.15  However, this commonality should not obscure the fundamental 
difference.  As discussed above, we hold that responsiveness to an aesthetic 
reason is itself a matter of appreciating the work on the basis of appreciating a 
part of the work, one whose excellence (in the context of the whole) makes the 
work itself excellent.  Merely registering that a certain affective response to a 
work is warranted in virtue of one of its parts, without actually appreciating it, is 
not responding to an aesthetic reason qua an aesthetic reason.16  
Finally, we emphasize two crucial differences between aesthetic pleasure 
and perception.  Aesthetic pleasure, we hold, is like perception in its power to 
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reveal the world, and to reveal it immediately rather than mediately (more on 
that below). But it is unlike perception in the following respects.  
First, whereas questions about “truth” are applicable to perceptual 
experiences, questions about “merit” and about their appropriateness to their 
objects are not.  But those questions do apply to our emotions and at least to 
some of our feelings, including aesthetic pleasures and displeasures.  
Correspondingly, unlike perceptible properties such as color, beauty (among 
other varieties of aesthetic value) is not simply a quality that, under proper 
conditions, is experienced in a certain way, but one that merits being experienced 
in a certain way—viz., through the relevant kind of pleasure. 
Second, perception and aesthetic pleasure function differently in the 
practice of giving and asking for reasons. Perception (at least according to most 
accounts) is not based on reasons.  But aesthetic pleasure, we argue, is. Recall 
that, on our view, aesthetic pleasure is no mere liking, but a liking of an object in 
light of the features that make it worthy of being liked.  Aesthetic pleasure does 
not simply reveal the object to have a certain property—beauty—but (often, if not 
always) reveals the beauty of the object in relation to those features that confer 
beauty on it.  Normally, we don’t simply like the object, but like it in virtue of 
liking something(s) about it.  Thus, in experiencing a beautiful object, we 
appreciate both the aesthetic worth of the object and the various features of the 
object we would cite to justify the claim that it has this worth.  We might put the 
point as follows:  There is an isomorphism between the structure of the pleasure 
and the relation between the beauty of the object as a whole and those of its 
features that make it beautiful.  In appreciating the object, we (in ideal cases) 
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take in both its beauty and what makes it beautiful.  Hence, the rational “why?” 
question is applicable to aesthetic pleasure.  And so, whereas perception is not 
based on reasons, aesthetic pleasure is.   
Crucially, neither of these differences between perception and 
appreciation undermines the idea that appreciation makes beauty in the world 
manifest.  On our view, then, while aesthetic pleasure reveals aesthetic value no 
less than perception reveals certain non-evaluative properties, it is a different 
kind of state and it belongs to a different domain of rationality.17 
   
II. Now that we have sketched our positive view of aesthetic judgment, we 
will argue for it as a compelling way of resolving an apparent tension between its 
subjective and objective dimensions.  On the one hand, there are features of 
aesthetic discourse that are best explained by viewing aesthetic judgment as a 
matter of the judger’s own experience of the relevant object.  On the other hand, 
aesthetic judgments purport to be about their objects, in a sense that allows for 
the possibility that some fit their objects better than others.  The latent difficulty 
here can be brought closer to the surface by considering the following two 
plausible yet seemingly inconsistent principles:  
Autonomy:  Neither the mere fact that everyone else makes a 
certain aesthetic judgment nor the testimony of experts can be 
adequate grounds for making the judgment oneself.18   
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Doubt:  Doubts about one’s aesthetic judgments can justifiably 
be based on the mere fact that everyone else disagrees or on the 
aesthetic judgment of an expert.  
In this section, we will show how various positions in the literature fail to balance 
properly the subjective and objective dimensions of aesthetic judgment by 
showing that they cannot adequately explain the truth of both Autonomy and 
Doubt.  We will call the difficulty of reconciling these principles Kant’s Problem, 
as they are derived from The Critique of Judgment.19   
Kant’s Problem arises because there seems to be no space between the idea 
that a consideration can serve as the basis of a doubt and the idea that a 
consideration can serve as the basis of a change of mind.  Even if the threshold 
for change of mind is higher than the threshold for doubt, the distance between 
them, one might expect, can be made up by the presence of more of whatever 
prompts doubt. 
Robert Hopkins, who has formulated and discussed Kant’s Problem with 
great insight, posits that ordinary empirical judgments (theoretical judgments 
about non-evaluative properties) are not autonomous because they are governed 
by ‘cognitive command’: “it is a priori that any [ordinary empirical] 
disagreement, if not due to vagueness in the terms deployed, must be put down to 
a cognitive failing on one side or the other.”20  The fact that others who are one’s 
equals in the quality of the relevant perceptual faculties, expertise, vantage point, 
etc., all disagree with one’s judgment can, according to this line of reasoning, 
constitute evidence that the failing is one’s own, and hence that one’s judgment is 
mistaken.  Cognitive command explains and entails the heteronomy of empirical 
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judgment and it also, of course, explains and entails the fact that one can doubt 
one’s own judgments on the basis of a contrary consensus. 
Hopkins goes on to argue that without something analogous to cognitive 
command in the aesthetic domain, it is not possible to explain why the aesthetic 
judgments of others should lead me to doubt my own.  The rationality of such 
doubt depends on the fact that aesthetic disagreement requires that someone be 
at fault.  But if doubt can be legitimately prompted by evidence (in the form of 
contrary consensus) that the fault is mine, such evidence should also in principle 
be capable of legitimately leading me to change my mind.   
Testimony generates the same problem.  (Hopkins’s discussion of Kant’s 
Problem focuses on contrary consensus.)  One might judge that the familiar-
looking bird on one’s birdfeeder is a downy woodpecker.  But now suppose that a 
visiting ornithologist assures one that it is a hairy woodpecker.  The visitor’s 
superior expertise to one’s own, together with the incompatibility of the 
judgments, constitutes a reason for one to doubt one’s judgment.  But it also 
constitutes a reason for one to change one’s mind.  It is not clear how the 
aesthetic domain could be different enough from the theoretical domain to block 
a testimony-based change of mind without also being different enough to block 
testimony-based doubts. 
Two subjectivist strategies hold promise for resolving Kant’s Problem: 
Relativism and Expressivism.  
Relativism about aesthetic judgment is the view that although aesthetic 
judgments are truth-apt, their truth is relative to the sensibility of the speaker.21 
Were such a view correct, neither contrary consensus nor testimony could by 
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itself be a reason for one to change one’s mind, since the judgment of the others 
may not be inconsistent with one’s own.  We all might be correct, since their 
judgment might be relative to one sensibility while one’s own might be relative to 
another.  Thus, Autonomy is explained.   
But here’s the rub:  if neither consensus nor expert judgment provides 
reasons for one to change one’s mind, how can they provide reasons for one to 
doubt one’s judgment?  A Relativist might try to thread the needle via the 
observation that doubt is easier than judgment.  One may not know whether a 
group shares one’s sensibility or not.  Because one does not know for sure that 
they do, it would be wrong to change one’s mind.  Because one does not know for 
sure that they don’t, it wouldn’t be wrong to doubt whether one is correct. In a 
state of uncertainty about the sensibility of others, one can be justified in 
doubting without being justified in changing one’s mind.  Since such uncertainty 
arguably characterizes the normal situation, this provides a neat explanation of 
the plausibility of both principles. 
However, the deeper problem with this approach is precisely that it leaves 
sensibility beyond the reach of these principles.  Here is the supposed datum that 
Relativism exploits:  Autonomy fits cases in which people do not share a 
sensibility, but not ones in which they do; Doubt fits the cases in which people do 
share my sensibility, but not in which they do not.  However, neither principle is 
limited according to whether the relevant others do or do not share one’s 
sensibility.  Even if one knows for sure that a group shares one’s sensibility, their 
judgment is still not sufficient reason for changing one’s mind.  So long as one 
experiences the film as contrived, badly acted and ineptly directed, the mere fact 
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that those with whom one shares a sensibility say it is good cannot put one in a 
position to express what is ordinarily expressed by statements such as “North by 
Northwest is a great movie”.  Furthermore, even if one knows for sure that they 
do not share one’s sensibility, their judgment is still sufficient for one to doubt 
one’s judgment, for their judgment can lead one to doubt one’s own sensibility.  
Autonomy still applies even with regard to those who share a sensibility; and 
Doubt still applies even with regard to those who do not.  Relativism cannot solve 
Kant’s Problem.22  
 One might resist this ‘deeper problem’ objection in various ways.  Some 
might insist that contrary consensus or testimony among those who share one’s 
sensibility would make changing one’s mind perfectly reasonable.  But someone 
who responds in this way is an unusual advocate of Autonomy.  For it is often 
linked with:  
Acquaintance:  Aesthetic judgments “must be based on first-
hand experience of their objects.”23  
Indeed, it seems that Acquaintance provides the beginning of an intuitively 
satisfying explanation of Autonomy.24  However, Relativism holds that 
Acquaintance is false: aesthetic judgments based on second-hand experience are 
fine, so long as the hands belong to someone with one’s own sensibility.  At best, 
Relativism caters to a tiny audience:  those who accept Autonomy but reject 
Acquaintance.25    
Next, Expressivism: one might argue that what explains Autonomy is that 
an aesthetic judgment is a reflection simply of whether an object pleases one, 
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rather than of a belief that the object possesses a certain aesthetic property.  A 
statement such as “North by Northwest is excellent” expresses a positive aesthetic 
feeling about the film, not a belief in a proposition.26  Thus, neither the mere fact 
that most everyone else disagrees nor the fact that an expert testifies to a contrary 
verdict can provide me with the correct basis for changing my mind.  For these 
cannot bestow upon me the feeling that an alternative judgment expresses.   
But the Expressivist has problems with Doubt.  Traditionally, 
Expressivism is motivated in part by irrealism about normative properties.  The 
contemporary Expressivist project in metaethics is precisely to work out a 
semantics according to which disagreement, entailment, modality, etc., can be 
present in normative discourse despite the (supposed) fact that normative 
statements are not in the business of describing the world—are not ‘factual’.  
Thus, aesthetic disagreement could not, according to traditional Expressivism, be 
a matter of logically incompatible descriptions of a particular object. 
But if contrary consensus or expert testimony justifies me in doubting my 
judgment, it must be because the correctness of one judgment comes at the 
expense of the correctness of the other.  Can the traditional Expressivist explain 
Doubt?  Such explanation seems to require, if not the reality of aesthetic 
properties, then something else that explains why, when two parties disagree, one 
must be wrong.  This is the idea of cognitive command.27  It’s important to see 
that an explanation of cognitive command requires more than an account of 
disagreement. Aesthetic disagreement might be explained by assigning to 
contrary aesthetic verdicts incompatible states of mind.  But the fact that 
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someone else is (or even many others are) in a state of mind incompatible with 
my own cannot by itself explain why I should think mine is wrong.  
We believe that contemporary Expressivism—even in its more 
sophisticated forms—cannot account for cognitive command, and so also cannot 
account for Doubt.  But before we examine one such form, it is worth 
emphasizing that we do not think this is an objection to what is perhaps the core 
idea of Expressivism: that aesthetic judgment is a matter not of belief but of 
feeling—of a ‘pro’ or ‘con’ affective attitude towards the object.  Indeed, we take 
this idea to be correct.  We are thus, at least in this weak sense, Expressivists.28  
But we hold that the best understanding of the core idea liberates it from 
metaphysical anxieties about the reality of aesthetic properties and value.  The 
upshot of our objection is not that Kant’s Problem can’t be resolved by utilizing 
this core Expressivist idea, but rather that it can’t be resolved within a framework 
that doesn’t take beauty to be real.29 The solution requires a conception of the 
relevant feeling according to which it reveals (in ideal cases) genuine features of 
the world, and is thus, in that sense, cognitive. We will return to our version of 
Expressivism below. 
 Can a more sophisticated version of Expressivism account for Doubt?  
Allan Gibbard, in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, makes a special point of explaining 
the normative authority of the moral judgments of others.  This is perhaps the 
most fully developed account of (the moral analogue) to Doubt that an 
Expressivist has given.  His view, roughly, is that when we disagree about a moral 
judgment, you can claim normative authority over me and put me under rational 
pressure to reconsider my judgment by expressing your acceptance of a higher-
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order moral norm that prescribes your judgment in this case.  I will be rationally 
influenced by your claim either if I too hold the relevant higher-level norm (but 
failed to see its implications) or even if I don’t, given the rationality of generally 
trusting the normative authority of others.  This line of argument might serve to 
explain why, when we disagree, I have reason to doubt my judgment.   
 But even if Gibbard’s account works for ethical normativity, it cannot be 
extended to aesthetics.  First, for him, moral judgments do not express feelings at 
all, but only the acceptance of norms.30  This would undermine the neat 
Expressivist account of Autonomy sketched above.  Second, and more 
importantly, a Gibbard-style explanation of Doubt does not carry over to the 
aesthetic domain.  It is not plausible, for example, that a film buff’s insistence 
that The Sacrifice is a great movie leads me to doubt my own contrary judgment 
by expressing a commitment to a general binding norm that requires everyone to 
judge similarly.  For it is not clear that there are generally binding aesthetic 
norms that are relevantly analogous to generally binding moral norms.  The 
prospects for a principle or set of principles that could credibly claim to cover 
every artistic success and exclude every failure are dim.31  And the relation 
between general aesthetic norms, if there are any, and aesthetic judgments is not 
analogous to the relation between general moral norms and moral judgments.  
One cannot prove, e.g., that The Sacrifice is good by appealing to true 
generalizations about the goodness of works with certain features. No matter how 
true those generalizations may be, they cannot serve as premises in an argument, 
but only as guides for appreciation—they can only guide the hearer to appreciate 
whether and how the property at stake in the generalization is here, in this work, 
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a merit.32  Intuitively, it seems that when an aesthetic disagreement leads me to 
doubt a judgment, it does so by leading me to doubt my own taste, and so the 
judgments that flow from it.  Aesthetic disagreements are not a matter of either a 
clash of diverging, high-level aesthetic norms or failures to apply general norms, 
but rather of clashing tastes—diverging capacities for appreciation—and the 
shortcomings of their exercises.  
This does not prove, of course, that a different irrealist Expressivist cannot 
succeed where our imagined Gibbard-style aesthetician has failed.  But it does 
show how an already difficult challenge for the moral Expressivist is exacerbated 
when she turns her attention to aesthetic normativity.  It is thus unsurprising 
that Todd, in the most well-developed defense of aesthetic Expressivism, all but 
rules out Doubt.  For him, the “normative demand” of aesthetic judgment is 
limited to “getting others to experience the relevant object in the same way, or to 
adopt the same attitude towards it,” while allowing that “there may be various 
incompatible, though equally 'valid' or appropriate, judgments concerning any 
aesthetic object.”33   
We contend, however, that the very plausible, feeling-based Expressivist 
explanation of Autonomy can be combined with an account of Doubt that is 
sensitive to the specific character of aesthetic normativity and aesthetic 
disagreement.  Before showing how, we will consider objectivist approaches to 
Kant’s Problem.  
 
 Whereas subjectivist approaches to Kant’s Problem exaggerate the 
differences between the aesthetic and theoretical domains, objectivist approaches 
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understate them.  According to the traditional objectivist conception, aesthetic 
judgments are simply beliefs with aesthetic contents.  The difficulty in explaining 
Autonomy will then be to say why what can perfectly well serve as a legitimate 
reason for holding a belief on a non-aesthetic topic cannot serve as a legitimate 
reason for holding a belief on an aesthetic one.34   
Those objectivists who think heteronomous aesthetic beliefs are 
illegitimate are, following Hopkins’s terminology, Pessimists (about the 
legitimacy of second-hand aesthetic judgments).  A Pessimist holds that the 
problem with such a belief is that it violates a norm of some sort.  Hopkins 
divides the Pessimists into two camps.  According to the Unavailability Pessimist, 
aesthetic testimony as a rule violates a general necessary epistemic condition on 
the legitimacy of testimony as a source of knowledge.35  According to the 
Unusability Pessimist, there is a non-epistemic norm that proscribes (under 
certain conditions) adopting a second-hand belief about aesthetic merit—even 
though such a belief, were it adopted, would constitute aesthetic knowledge.36  
Both Pessimistic strategies could explain why one ought not adopt beliefs under 
the conditions specified by Autonomy and Acquaintance.   
Since these are would-be norms of belief, they would technically be 
consistent with Doubt.  Second-hand aesthetic knowledge is unattainable or 
unusable; but nonetheless, doubt based on testimony or consensus might yet be 
OK.  Of course, some explanation of this discrepancy would be owed. 
But no matter how the discrepancy is resolved, neither form of Pessimism 
is adequate to the phenomenon.  Consider a relatively ordinary context in which 
one is called upon to render an aesthetic judgment: what one might call the Ten-
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Best-Films game.  At the end of each year, professional film critics publish their 
lists of that year’s best films.  Often, they defend them in roundtable discussions 
with other critics.  Non-professionals get in on the act too, in online film-related 
discussion groups, late night dorm-room arguments, and the like.  Imagine 
someone who puts Timbuktu on her list despite not having seen it, or despite 
having seen it but only on account of the film’s Rotten Tomatoes score.  Here are 
two possible reactions: (a) although she has constructed a list of the relevant sort, 
it is a bad specimen insofar as she used inappropriate criteria; or (b) she has flat-
out failed to construct a list of the relevant sort.  We submit that the best answer 
is (b).  If you were compiling the ten-best lists of each member of your 
department so as to construct a departmental ten-best list, you would be justified 
in excluding the submission of someone known to have arrived at her list 
heteronymously, just as you would be justified in excluding the submission of 
someone known to have constructed her ballot by throwing darts at a newspaper-
listing of films currently showing in theatres.   
Contrast these sorts of cases with someone who takes the pinnacle of film-
art to be The Human Centipede, a film that he will, if called upon, defend with 
evident sincerity and relish.  However reluctantly, one would be obliged to 
include his ballot no matter how loathsome and wrong his selections might be.   
Why is the exclusion of the Rotten-Tomatoes-based list and that of the 
dart-thrower justified?  Because neither one is playing the Ten-Best-Films game, 
which calls upon each player to rank films according to their own aesthetic 
judgment.  In neither case is the ballot a reflection of the voter’s aesthetic 
judgment.  This is the best explanation of our reluctance to accept the imagined 
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submissions. We are justified in excluding these ballots because they fail to 
express the submitters’ aesthetic judgments.  
Compare this with what the Pessimist must say about these cases.  Note 
that Pessimistic approaches to understanding apparently acceptable 
heteronomous utterances are likely to appeal to the thought that the norm that 
explains Autonomy and Acquaintance lapses in the relevant contexts.  Hopkins 
suggests that it lapses “if one can neither stay agnostic, nor settle the matter for 
oneself.”37  But this claim both delivers the wrong verdict about the cases under 
discussion and, more importantly, does not supply the right sort of explanation of 
what goes wrong when someone violates these conditions. 
Suppose a player of the Ten-Best-Films game says, (i) “I am sure that 
Timbuktu is a great movie—after all, Dargis said so—but I am not putting it on 
my ten-best list because I found it boring.”  The alleged norm is in effect (the 
speaker has seen the movie and is not agnostic about it) and violated (he is 
relying, in saying that it’s great, on the testimony of an expert).  However, the 
verdict is wrong.  There’s nothing amiss about this statement and the 
corresponding Ten-Best list.  But even if there were, the statement would still not 
be problematic in the same way as: (ii) “I am sure that Timbuktu is a great 
movie—after all, Dargis said so—but I did not like it at all—so boring!  However, 
since she knows way more about film than I do, I will put it on my ten-best list.”   
(ii) is inarguably worse than (i).  The (ii)-speaker’s list should be excluded; the 
(i)-speaker’s list should not.  But since a governing norm is (supposedly) violated 
in both cases, something else must explain what has gone wrong with (ii).  Yet 
this is precisely what the norm is supposed to explain.  In contrast, we contend 
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that the problem with (ii) is that it purports to express an aesthetic judgment yet 
does not.  And this is why we do not simply find fault with this ballot (as we do 
with that of the Human Centipede-lover); we disqualify it.  This phenomenon is 
not explained by norm-violation.  The Pessimist therefore cannot account for 
these cases and so is wrong.  
How might a Pessimist respond to this line of objection?  She might argue, 
first, that (i) is OK because it does not purport to express the speakers own belief 
that the movie is great, but rather only appeals to the belief of the critic, to whom 
the speaker defers; and second, that (ii) is worse than (i) because the whole point 
of the Ten-Best-Films game is to produce a list that reflects the participants’ own 
experiences.38 
But the Pessimist’s account of (i) is highly implausible.  “I am sure that p, 
because S said so” does not amount simply to “S said so”.  The speaker expresses 
certainty that S is correct: mustn’t the speaker then believe what S says?  It is 
difficult to understand the relevant notion of deference in a way that does not 
entail that the one who defers accepts the judgment of the one deferred to.  The 
use of expressions that include modals in this configuration (e.g., “it must be a 
good movie, after all Dargis thinks so”) just is one of the conventional means of 
expressing beliefs about the value of artworks independently of the speakers’ own 
experiences of these works.  
This means that one benefit of our approach over the Pessimist’s is that it 
explains the unproblematic character of those stretches of aesthetic discourse in 
which we do express (or certainly seem to express) aesthetic beliefs that plainly 
do not stem from our own experiences, and do so without running afoul of any 
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norms.  To this we add that we act (or certainly seem to act) on the basis of beliefs 
thereby expressed: we go to see films on the basis of positive recommendations 
and avoid films on the basis of negative recommendations.  A natural 
interpretation of this conduct is as follows:  We go to see a film because it is good 
or avoid it because it is bad—or so we believe.  In such cases, even if we do not 
have aesthetic knowledge, we certainly use aesthetic beliefs in a perfectly 
legitimate manner independently of experiencing the works for ourselves, which 
means, on our account, despite not being in a position to make an aesthetic 
judgment about the relevant work.  This is further reason to doubt the Pessimist’s 
conviction that one may not form any beliefs about the quality of artworks with 
which one is not acquainted.  It is also reason to doubt her analysis of (i).  The 
speaker’s belief that Timbuktu is a good film can explain why, despite having 
found it boring on first viewing, she watches it again, keeping in mind what 
Dargis likes about it.  
 As for the Pessimist’s explanation of why (ii) is worse than (i), we entirely 
agree: the point of the Ten-Best-List game is indeed to capture the players’ 
experiences of the films.  This follows from its being a game in which the players 
are called upon to make aesthetic judgments.  But while our view has the internal 
resources to explain and justify the demand that the ballots reflect the 
participants’ own experiences—resources that are part and parcel of our notion of 
aesthetic judgment—the Pessimist approach has no such internal resources. 
Furthermore, and for that very reason, while our explanation of the demand 
treats it as part of a unified phenomenon (i.e., of aesthetic appreciation as such), 
the Pessimist must argue that what goes on in this game is discontinuous with 
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what goes on in ordinary discussions and disputes about the qualities of 
artworks.  But there is no reason to believe in such a discontinuity.  This game is 
just a more regimented form of everyday discourse about art.  The same 
considerations that bear on ordinary discussions and disputes bear equally on 
those playing the game.  And the thought that heteronomous ballots should be 
disqualified is just a more regimented form of the dismissal that would greet the 
confession that one had not seen the film about whose merits one had been 
debating for the past hour.   
The Pessimist might attempt to explain the requirement that participants 
express their own experiences by claiming that the purpose of the Ten-Best-Film 
game is simply to rank the amount of pleasure each voter took in experiencing 
the films made that year.  But this is clearly wrong.  For if this were the purpose 
of the game, then there would be no point in arguing about the rankings.  The fact 
that there is such a point shows that what is at issue is not only pleasure but at 
the same time quality, which is to say pleasure in what deserves to be enjoyed.  
Our notion of aesthetic judgment makes the best sense of this phenomenon, and 
hence the best sense of what is wrong with (ii). 
We conclude, then, that the problem with a supposed heteronomous 
aesthetic judgment is not that it is an aesthetic judgment that violates a norm, but 
that it is not an aesthetic judgment at all.  Sibley was right: nothing that is not 
based on one’s own experience of the work, and so nothing that is based on 
consensus or testimony, is an aesthetic judgment.39  Although we have 
formulated Autonomy and Acquaintance as normative, they are thus better 
understood as metaphysical or formal.  One cannot make aesthetic judgments 
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second-hand.  Pessimism cannot adopt this explanation. For the Pessimist holds 
that aesthetic judgment is just a belief that an object possesses an aesthetic 
property. And there are no good reasons to think that it is impossible to hold such 
a belief on the grounds of consensus or testimony.  
Of the approaches we have considered thus far, Expressivism is in the best 
position to explain the impossibility of heteronomous aesthetic judgments.  For 
aesthetic judgment, according to Expressivism, is a matter of an affective 
response to the work itself.  This would explain why a supposed heteronomous 
aesthetic judgment, which is by hypothesis not based on any reaction to the work 
itself, is not simply bad, qua aesthetic judgment, but is not one at all.  Let us 
return, then, to Expressivism.   
We argued above that it is difficult to square the Expressivist’s traditional 
commitment to irrealism with Doubt.  To explain Doubt, we need the idea that 
the reasons for thinking one judgment is correct are thereby reasons for thinking 
that a contrary judgment is incorrect.  Even sophisticated forms of traditional 
Expressivist lack the resources to properly explain such correctness.  But we 
contend that this problem does not arise merely from the core idea. One can 
explain such correctness even if one holds that aesthetic judgment is an 
expression not of belief, but of feeling.  We embrace the core idea, but argue that 
the relevant sort of feeling purports to suit the object.  When our capacity for 
aesthetic appreciation is exercised successfully, we judge (a judgment constituted 
by feeling) that an object is beautiful because the object is beautiful.  If it is not 
beautiful or if one’s judgment is not based in the right way on its beauty, one is 
exercising the capacity for judging aesthetically in a defective manner.  We thus 
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have no special problem with accounting for the idea that some aesthetic 
judgments are correct in the sense of presenting the object as it really is, and thus 
that, necessarily, contrary judgments are incorrect.   
It might be thought that this improvement in the prospects for explaining 
Doubt comes at the expense of the prospects for explaining Autonomy.  After all, 
if it is a plain fact that a certain object is beautiful, then one can believe that it is 
beautiful and believe that it is beautiful on the basis of consensus or testimony.  
This is precisely the problem for the traditional objectivist.  But we avoid this 
problem by distinguishing between aesthetic judgment and aesthetic belief.   
There is no insuperable obstacle to justifiably believing that an object is beautiful 
on the basis of consensus or testimony, but such a belief is neither an aesthetic 
judgment nor a proper basis for one. 
According to our solution to Kant’s Problem, Autonomy and Doubt can 
both be true because, whereas Autonomy pertains directly to aesthetic 
judgments, Doubt pertains to them indirectly via beliefs with aesthetic contents. 
Ours is a dual explanandum solution.40  Hopkins contends that a dual-
explanandum solution cannot in the end explain everything that must be 
explained.  He charges, specifically, that this strategy amounts to a retraction of 
Autonomy:    
What constraint am I subject to if there is a proposition, 
concerning the film’s (lack of) beauty, which I can legitimately 
adopt simply on the basis that so many others express a 
judgment of taste at odds with my own? That proposition is, on 
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the current proposal, not a judgment of taste, but it is the next 
best thing. It is a proposition concerning the film’s beauty. To 
suppose that such a thing is available to me is in effect to reject 
our original claim that I cannot on this basis legitimately change 
my mind.41  
We contend rather that the changing of one’s mind can be understood in two 
ways: as a change of aesthetic judgment (constituted by aesthetic feeling) or as a 
change of theoretical judgment (constituted by a belief about the aesthetic 
properties of objects).  Autonomy applies to the former, but not the latter. 
Statements about the beauty of objects sometimes express one kind of judgment, 
and sometimes the other. In contrast to the objectivist accounts on offer, we hold 
that “O is beautiful” expresses an aesthetic judgment only when it expresses a 
distinctive kind of pleasure. The judgment that objectivists regard as aesthetic 
judgment—a belief about the aesthetic value of the object—is a theoretical 
judgment with aesthetic content. 
Hopkins charges that the “dual explanandum” approach is “tinkering with 
the phenomenon.”42  To defend ourselves from this charge, we must explain why 
our semantic claims are “sensible things to say, rather than mere recitation of the 
view’s commitments.”43  He asks: “what grounds do we have for thinking that 
claims of the form ‘O is beautiful’ in fact divide into two very different semantic 
types?”44   
 To reply to the ‘tinkering’ charge, let us go back to the Ten-Best-Films 
game.  If, in defense of one’s ballot, one participant makes a statement such as 
“Timbuktu is a great film,” we take this to express an aesthetic judgment.  In so 
 29 
taking it, we understand it as autonomous.  However, there are various ways that 
one can signal that one is not expressing an aesthetic judgment, but rather an 
aesthetic belief.  We might say, “Timbuktu must be/ has to be/definitely is/surely 
is/certainly is a good film, it is on your list after all.”  Here we are expressing an 
attitude towards the proposition that the film is good, and the simultaneously 
avowed heteronomy does not render the statement defective.  So long as we do 
not offer this as a justification for putting the movie on our list—and so as a 
justification for our own aesthetic judgment—no one would object.  
We hold that in most contexts, modally and epistemically uninflected 
statements of the form ‘o is beautiful’ and the like are aesthetic judgments, 
whereas those with modal or epistemic inflections are theoretical judgments.  
Such theoretical judgments are occasionally also expressed without any such 
inflection, but in those cases the context makes clear that the speaker is not 
expressing her own aesthetic judgment.  The modally and epistemically inflected 
versions then show how to disambiguate such instances of ‘o is beautiful’ and the 
like from those that express aesthetic judgments.  This is, of course, but one 
possible account of the difference between utterances of these sorts.  But note 
that the other candidates (be they semantic or pragmatic accounts) will be 
alternative explanations of a genuine distinction among aesthetic predications, 
and not merely a distinction in which we believe because it is one of our view’s 
commitments.    
It is also worth emphasizing that the value of the distinction between 
aesthetic judgment and aesthetic belief goes beyond its role in disambiguating 
occurrences of ‘o is beautiful’.  As we have argued, the distinction also accounts 
 30 
straightforwardly for the flagrant (and unproblematic) heteronomy of the 
modalized variations of such statements and the way aesthetic recommendations 
influence what art we choose to experience (without conferring on us the capacity 
to pass aesthetic judgment on it).  Hopkins’ charge that the dual explanandum 
approach depends on “tinkering with the phenomenon” is groundless.  The 
distinction is an essential part of an account that enables us to understand the 
full range of aesthetic discourse and its surrounding practices.   
The dual explanandum approach, we have now argued, provides just the 
right approach to Autonomy.  But now it might again seem a poor fit for Doubt.  
For whereas it is plausible to limit Autonomy and Acquaintance to aesthetic 
judgment, Doubt cannot plausibly be restricted to aesthetic belief.  The point of 
the principle—and this is exactly what threatens to bring it into conflict with the 
others—is that evidence and testimony do, in a sense, bear on aesthetic 
judgments.  If The Sacrifice leaves me cold—“not a great movie,” I say—but I later 
hear of the rapturous consensus of the critics whose judgment I most respect, 
what I doubt is not merely an affirmative attitude towards a proposition, but 
whether my own aesthetic judgment about the movie is correct.  As a 
consequence, I might re-watch the film and try harder, guided by the 
appreciation of others, to see its merits.  Yet it is not clear how, on the dual 
explanandum view, evidence and testimony bear at all on aesthetic judgment, 
since it is autonomous.  
We can begin to assuage this concern by reminding the reader that, on our 
view, the aesthetic belief that an object is beautiful is the belief that the object 
merits the feeling constitutive of an aesthetic judgment, a feeling that (in ideal 
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cases) is (i) revelatory of the world, (ii) merited by the object, (iii) required from 
everyone else as well, and (iv) not grounded in the object’s satisfaction of any 
ends.45  To entertain doubt is thereby to suspect or even to believe, on evidential 
or testimonial grounds, that one is either enjoying what one should not or failing 
to enjoy what one should.  Doubt thereby extends to aesthetic judgment itself, 
albeit from without.   
We expand on this as follows.  Aesthetic judgment (when all goes well) is a 
feeling in which the world reveals itself to us.  It is, like a perception, a 
presentation of something in the world as being a certain way—of an object as 
beautiful.  Because aesthetic judgment is a feeling, it is not the sort of thing that 
can be based on evidence or testimony.  Still, an aesthetic belief that, say, The 
Sacrifice is good, perhaps based on the testimony of others, is in conflict with the 
aesthetic judgment that the film is bad.  For the truth of the belief is incompatible 
with the correctness of the judgment.  Thus, there can be no quarantining doubt 
about aesthetic belief from doubt about aesthetic judgment, even if such doubt, 
applies in the first instance to beliefs.  Making an aesthetic judgment that a 
certain work is good while at the same time believing on the basis of evidence 
that it is not good is incoherent in much the same way as being frightened of x is 
in tension with believing that x poses no threat.  For example, an airline 
passenger, panicking during severe turbulence, might scream “we’re all going to 
die!”, even though he knows—intellectually, as we say—that severe turbulence 
cannot bring a plane down.  He is giving voice to his fear rather than his 
knowledge (or belief).  Similarly, to express an aesthetic judgment, on our view, is 
to give voice to appreciation, to speak from the point of view of our appreciation.  
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When this clashes with an incompatible aesthetic belief, we have reason to doubt 
our aesthetic judgment.  
The distinction between aesthetic belief and aesthetic judgment raises the 
question of how to understand the difference in their content.  To work this out in 
detail would require a substantial essay of its own, so we will confine ourselves 
here to laying out the difference in broad strokes.  Aesthetic belief is an attitude 
towards a proposition that contains an aesthetic predicate; to believe it is to take 
it to be true.  To see the contrast with aesthetic judgment, consider again the 
example of fear.  In being scared of x, one views x as dangerous.  Fear presents an 
object as dangerous.  Unlike belief, fear (we would argue) is not a mediating 
representation of a state of affairs that might or might not depict reality 
accurately.  Rather, fear presents the object directly as bearing a certain property, 
in something like the sense in which—at least according to direct realist 
accounts—perception presents objects as bearing certain properties.  (But, as we 
emphasized above, this analogy goes only so far.)  Because fear presents an object 
as being a certain way, it can present the world in a way that it isn’t, and it can 
conflict with belief.  This is precisely how we view aesthetic judgment: it presents 
an object as beautiful, and therefore can conflict with an aesthetic belief 
regarding that same object.  “North by Northwest is excellent” can express either 
an appreciation of the film—a feeling that presents the film as excellent—or a 
belief that the proposition “North by Northwest is excellent” is true.46 
A full account of aesthetic judgment would have to say in detail how 
aesthetic judgment presents objects as beautiful.  We have already begun to do so 
above in noting the distinctive characteristics of appreciation: part of what it is to 
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appreciate an object is to view it as meriting this very appreciation, as meriting 
appreciation from everyone, and as not being a matter of its fitness for some 
other purpose. 
A different worry concerns the centrality of the notion of pleasure in our 
account.  It will be observed that our judgment that an artwork is excellent may 
be grounded in part in our being shocked, unsettled, horrified, terrified, 
nauseated or depressed by it.47  This might seem to undermine the idea that 
aesthetic judgment is a feeling of pleasure.  
But we would argue that this objection is based on an unjustifiably narrow 
conception of pleasure.  Consider for example someone who says, “The Piano 
Teacher is a great film; but I certainly did not enjoy it.”   Let us stipulate that the 
first conjunct of this statement expresses an aesthetic judgment and not an 
aesthetic belief.  On our view, in making the judgment, the speaker is expressing 
an attitude towards the film analogous (in certain respects) to what a masochist 
feels towards certain kinds of pain, viz., pleasure.  On the one hand, what the 
masochist enjoys is by definition pain of various sorts.  But on the other hand, the 
masochist, again by definition, enjoys the pain.  The masochist, then, takes 
pleasure in the broadest sense in pain (in what must be a narrower sense of the 
term “pain”).  Similarly, our Haneke-appreciator takes pleasure (in the broadest 
sense) in the unpleasant (in the narrow sense).48  This is (clearly, we hope) not to 
say that she is a masochist, only that we are already familiar with a broad 
conception of pleasure such that it is not incoherent to describe someone as 
enjoying something that she finds unpleasant.  To like an artwork in the relevant 
sense is not necessarily to be cheered, uplifted, reassured, warmed, etc.  
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Nonetheless, it is pleasure in the broadest sense that explains why the viewer of 
the Piano Teacher continues to watch the film, is annoyed at having to wait until 
tomorrow to finish it, and rushes home after work to do so.  This would explain 
the Moore-like peculiarity of a statement of the form “o is beautiful, but I do not 
like it”.  (Indeed, one might dub this “The Aesthetic Version of Moore’s 
Paradox”.)  And so we hold that a judgment that is divorced from aesthetic 
appreciation—and therefore from pleasure—is not an aesthetic judgment.  
 Throughout our discussion in this section, we have simply assumed the 
truth of Autonomy and Acquaintance.  We hold that our explanation of their 
consistency with Doubt constitutes a powerful consideration in favor of our view.  
Furthermore, the opposition to Autonomy and Acquaintance results, we would 
argue, in part from failing to distinguish between aesthetic judgment and belief, 
and so failing to see that a justified second-hand aesthetic belief does not refute 
these principles.   
We thus make precisely the opposite point as Meskin, who diagnoses the 
appeal of a position like ours as follows: 
 Perhaps the neo-Kantian has confused what is required for 
aesthetic experience and art appreciation with what is necessary 
for making an aesthetic judgment. It is eminently plausible that 
the appreciation of a work of art requires experiencing it. So 
there are things that testimony may never provide—aesthetic 
experiences and artistic appreciation. But it does not follow from 
this that aesthetic judgment is essentially linked to experience.49  
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He holds that there is no internal connection between appreciation and aesthetic 
judgment.  This is (we speculate) in part because McDowell’s idea—that the world 
can reveal itself as being a certain way through appreciation—has simply gone 
missing.  When it is missed, it seems as if appreciation can only be something 
that merely accompanies the formation of aesthetic beliefs in certain 
circumstances.  But this separation of appreciation and aesthetic judgment blinds 
one to the best solution to Kant’s Problem. 
 This point also bears on the following objection to our view.  It might be 
charged that our solution to Kant’s Problem is, at bottom, simply to re-label 
appreciation ‘aesthetic judgment’, which everyone agrees is a matter feeling.  The 
dispute then becomes a purely verbal one about the meaning of a technical term.  
However, this is not the right way to describe what is at issue.  In metaethics, the 
debate between the cognitivists and the non-cognitivists concerns what state of 
mind is expressed by moral statements.   Similarly, the debate about the nature of 
aesthetic judgment concerns what state of mind is expressed by statements such 
as “North by Northwest is excellent” as they occur in paradigmatic contexts, e.g., 
in critical discussions of the value of artworks.  The technical term ‘aesthetic 
judgment’ refers to whatever is thereby expressed.  We have argued for a 
substantive thesis that it is appreciation.  Insofar as appreciation is understood as 
mere sensation, it will not appear to be a plausible candidate.  But understood as 
we have elucidated here, appreciation is a far better candidate than belief. 
 
In the first section, we discussed three wrong ways of understanding 
aesthetic judgment: as theoretical judgment, as practical judgment, and as 
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private pleasure.  Our argument in the second section is directed at the first and 
the third.  We may therefore have seemed to overlook a central class of views:  
those that understand aesthetic judgment at least in part in practical terms.  
Among views actually discussed in the literature, the one that comes closest 
concerns aesthetic value: for an object to exemplify aesthetic value is for it to be 
appropriate (among other things) to act in certain ways with respect to it—to go 
see it, at least.50  An aesthetic judgment would, on such a view, be the judgment 
that the object has the relevant value, and therefore that the relevant behaviors 
are justified.  But—and here we echo the point made about Sentimentalism 
above—although this amounts to a reduction of aesthetic value to (among other 
things) reasons for acting, it is not a reduction of aesthetic judgment to (among 
other things) practical judgment.  For aesthetic judgment on these views is just 
the belief that an object provides the relevant reasons for acting, and is thus the 
sort of thing that one can hold on the basis of consensus or testimony.  Because 
these views take aesthetic judgment to be belief, they fall into the scope of the 
argument in this section.  It does not matter, for the purposes of our argument, 
that these beliefs are taken to concern aesthetic value understood in practical 
terms.  It is not clear to us that anyone actually holds the view that, in saying that 
a painting is good, one is making a recommendation to do something, a 
recommendation whose justification would therefore be a reason to do it.  Our 












                                                   
1 Joseph Raz, From Normativity to Responsibility (New York: Oxford, 2011), 2.5.  
2  As we shall discuss, it is widely assumed that an aesthetic judgment just is a 
theoretical judgment with aesthetic content.  Even those who would explain 
aesthetic value in terms of practical norms (e.g., T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to 
Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard, 1998) and John Skorupski, “Sentimentalism: 
Its Scope and Limits,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, XIII, 2 (2011): 125-
136), view aesthetic judgment as fundamentally theoretical in the relevant sense. 
3  For the sake of rhetorical simplicity, we use the term ‘appreciation’ only for 
aesthetic appreciation. We introduce the characteristic marks of the aesthetic 
variety of appreciation in section I.  
4 The broad construal of the notion of evidence includes heterogeneous kinds: 
perception, testimony, memory and evidence in the narrow sense, e.g., paw-
prints leading up to the mat.  
5 This picture of the structure of theoretical and practical rationality is developed 
in detail in Eric Marcus, Rational Causation (Cambridge: Harvard 2012). 
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6 We limit our discussion here to positive aesthetic judgment, but this view could 
be extended in fairly obvious ways to negative aesthetic judgment. See n. 12. 
7 The fact that the rational explanation of one’s appreciation appeals to the 
aesthetically significant parts of the object does not imply that these parts are 
aesthetically significant independently of the character of the object as a whole. 
Whether or not the aesthetically significant parts of an object merit appreciation 
depends upon very specific facts about the work as a whole, on what it is trying to 
accomplish, aesthetically speaking.  The method acting of a Kazan drama, for 
example, would destroy a Hitchcockian romantic comedy thriller.  It might be an 
impressive display of acting talent, but, in the relevant context, it would not be 
good acting.  Furthermore, elements of a work that, taken on their own, might be 
ugly can in fact be artistically satisfying in the context of the whole and thereby 
contribute to its beauty.  The whole, then, supplies the standards by which the 
parts are judged.  And the success of the parts relative to those standards, in turn, 
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